In the financial accelerator literature pioneered by Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) entrepreneurs are myopic and lenders suboptimally choose a safe rate of return on their loans. We derive the optimal lending contract for forward looking entrepreneurs and provide three main results. First, under the optimal contract we find that financial frictions do not amplify business cycle fluctuations. Second, we show that shocks to the variance of unobserved idiosyncratic productivityso-called "risk shocks" -have little effect on the real economy under the optimal contract. Third, we find that amplification under the suboptimal contract depends on loose monetary policy.
Introduction
In one of the foundational papers in the literature on financial frictions in macroeconomic models, Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) derive a contract between risk averse lenders and risk neutral borrowers in the costly state verification (CSV) framework of Townsend (1979).
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Although this loan contract has become the standard contract for CSV models of financial frictions, it is not optimal because it assumes returns for lenders are predetermined and borrowers are myopic.
In this paper we relax these two assumptions and derive the optimal history-independent loan contract in the CSV model. 2 We allow returns to the lender to be contingent on the aggregate state of the economy following early criticism of Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) , hereafter BGG, by Chari (2003) . We also introduce forward looking entrepreneurs who maximize the present discounted value of all future consumption instead of next period expected consumption.
Our analysis provides three main contributions. First, under the optimal contract we find that financial frictions do not amplify business cycles. Relative to a model with financial frictions, monetary and technology shocks generate much larger output responses when frictions are absent. 3 Second, we develop a novel framework to study the impact of shocks to the crosssectional variance of entrepreneurs' idiosyncratic productivity -so-called "risk" shocks -in the CSV environment. We show that these shocks have little to no impact on the real economy when lending contracts are optimal, in contrast with the BGG contract. This is particularly important as recent work by Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2013) emphasizes the importance of risk shocks in driving business cycles. We prove that risk shocks provide amplification only when the lending contract is suboptimal, regardless of the degree of lender's risk aversion. Third, we demonstrate that the financial accelerator in the original BGG framework is dependent on three key characteristics: a suboptimal contract, loose monetary policy and extremely persistent technology shocks. We conduct a number of robustness checks in Section 5 and find that the removal of any one of these characteristics significantly weakens or eliminates the financial accelerator. Overall, our results cast doubt on the qualitative and quantitative importance of the financial accelerator in the CSV framework.
Our model consists of a risk averse representative household and risk neutral entrepreneurs.
Entrepreneurs borrow money from the representative household and purchase capital to use in production. Entrepreneurs are identical ex ante but differ depending on the ex post realization 1 A non-exhaustive list of some important early contributions in this literature include Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) . 2 To be precise, we derive the optimal one-period contract with deterministic monitoring. An excellent list of references for partial equilibrium multi-period contracts includes Monnett and Quintin (2005) for stochastic monitoring, Wang (2005) for deterministic monitoring, and Cole (2013) for self-enforcing stochastic monitoring. 3 As we discuss later, the deamplification effect of the optimal contract is a general result that holds for a wide range of calibrations.
of an idiosyncratic productivity shock. Both agents have full information about the distribution of idiosyncratic shocks ex ante, so there is no adverse selection problem. Borrowers observe the realization of their idiosyncratic shock, but lenders do not: they need to pay monitoring costs to observe it.
In the BGG contract borrowers guarantee a constant safe rate of return to lenders in order to maximize returns on their equity. As a result, borrowers absorb all risk in the economy.
It should be noted that this is an assumption and not an equilibrium condition. Because of this assumption, negative shocks cause a decline in entrepreneurs' net worth which leads to a tightening of financial constraints. The subsequent fall in investment and output is stronger than the effect from the initial shock. This results in the financial accelerator: the BGG contract amplifies macroeconomic fluctuations in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model.
In BGG and the CSV literature entrepreneurs are myopic: they maximize their expected next period consumption, but expected utility depends on the expected discounted stream of all future consumption. We depart from the literature and embed forward looking entrepreneurs into an otherwise standard CSV framework. Our analysis provides a number of results that call the robustness of the financial accelerator into question under optimal and suboptimal contracts, for myopic and non-myopic entrepreneurs.
The intuition is as follows. When lenders' returns are predetermined, we find that to a first order approximation the lending contract is identical regardless of whether entrepreneurs are forward looking or myopic. In period t, the predetermined lending rate is chosen to satisfy the lender's Euler equation in that specific period without the possibility of revisions in period t + 1. As a result, it does not matter whether entrepreneurs are forward looking or not, as the lender's stochastic discount factor determines the rate of return. In order to generate amplification however, this suboptimal contract must be combined with other ingredients. In our robustness exercise in Section 5, we show that contracts with a predetermined deposit rate only generate a financial accelerator when monetary policy deviates from price stability and when technology shocks are stationary.
On the other hand, when lender's returns are chosen optimally and vary with the aggregate state of the economy, the presence of forward looking entrepreneurs or myopic entrepreneurs matters greatly. Myopic entrepreneurs sell as much insurance to the household as they can because insurance does not effect their next period expected consumption. During a recession, the provision of insurance leads to very tight financial constraints for entrepreneurs, as they face a higher lending rate due to the fall in household consumption. During a boom the opposite occurs: myopic entrepreneurs have too much capital and earn small returns on their capital.
In other words myopic entrepreneurs miss good investment opportunities on a consistent basis because they do not take the future flow of capital returns into account when making investment decisions. Under the optimal contract however, forward looking entrepreneurs sell less insurance because they are concerned not only about next period expected consumption but also expected consumption in all future periods, which is impacted by insurance claims. In particular, forward looking entrepreneurs desire high net worth in states of the world where the financial premium is also high.
For example, assume that ex-post there is a shock which suddenly decreases the entrepreneur's net worth. Lower net worth today means that the financial premium today and in the future will be higher. The entrepreneur desires more net worth in states with a higher financial premium because capital returns are higher and borrowing is more costly. Forward looking entrepreneurs thus find it profitable to enter into an ex-ante agreement that stipulates a lower lending rate in these states. Correspondingly, entrepreneurs prefer to pay a higher lending rate when a shock increases net worth, because the financial premium will be lower in these states. This interplay between movements in net worth and the financial premium leads risk-neutral entrepreneurs to behave in a "risk averse" manner because they want to avoid borrowing in states with a high financial premium. In contrast, if there is no costly state verification so that financial frictions are absent, non-myopic entrepreneurs will ignore concerns about the financial premium and provide as much insurance as possible, generating large amplification.
We also find that risk shocks have little effect on the real economy and give the wrong comovement between macroeconomic aggregates when contracts are optimal. This contrasts with Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2013), who employ the BGG contract and emphasize the importance of risk shocks in generating business cycle fluctuations. Under the BGG contract, increased idiosyncratic variance causes an increase in defaults leading to a decline in the price of capital and consequently net worth. However, if returns to lenders are not predetermined and entrepreneurs are forward looking, they realize that lower net worth implies higher financial premiums and more costly borrowing in the future. Therefore, forward looking entrepreneurs desire more net worth in these states and thus negotiate lower returns to lenders, which stabilizes the response of net worth to the shock. As a result, under the optimal contract the financial accelerator is severely dampened for risk shocks.
Related Literature
Our results are important because the CSV framework remains one of the benchmark methods for embedding financial friction in DSGE models. The literature follows the BGG framework and employs myopic entrepreneurs with suboptimal contracts. 4 A non-exhaustive survey of recent work in this area includes Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2013), Christensen and Dib 4 Recent work by Carlstrom, Fuerst and Paustian (2013), hereafter CFP, simultaneously and independently derives the dynamically optimal contract for forward looking households that we present here. In the January 2013 version of their working paper, CFP solve for the contingent contract with myopic entrepreneurs and find that financial frictions amplify business cycles. In the October 2013 version of their paper, CFP solve for the optimal contract with forward looking entrepreneurs. CFP focus on the social planner's problem and the relative social efficiency of the optimal contract vis-à-vis the BGG contract for technology and monetary shocks, while we focus on the following question: do optimal contracts mitigate the financial accelerator or not? In contrast with CFP, we compare the model with frictions against a frictionless benchmark to examine the role of optimal contracts in amplifying and propagating business cycle fluctuations. We also study the impact of risk shocks, which are absent in CFP. The CSV approach is not the only way to model financial frictions. In a related paper (Dmitriev and Hoddenbagh (2014) ) we investigate the effect of optimal state-contingent contracts in a model with costly state enforcement frictions a la Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) . In this alternative environment, we find that optimal state-contingent contracts severely dampen the amplification response from technology and monetary shocks. Again, our results demonstrate that amplification in the costly state enforcement literature is generated via the assumption of non-contingent lending contracts (Kiyotaki and Gertler (2010) and Gertler and Karadi (2011) ).
An exception is presented by Jermann and Quadrini (2012) , who allow both debt and equity contracts and achieve amplification by introducing adjustment costs between these instruments and ruling out other instruments. In the adverse selection framework, House (2006) extends the Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and also shows that financial frictions amplify business cycles only when returns for lenders are non-contingent. When contracts are contingent or allow both debt and equity, financial frictions actually stabilize business cycles.
In contrast to our paper, Di Tella (2013) investigates the role of optimal state-contingent contracts in a model with no labor and finds that risk shocks do generate amplification. Our model includes labor, and amplification is severely dampened for risk shocks as households use labor supply to stabilize their income even though the optimal contract shifts risk away from the balance sheet of entrepreneurs. We believe Di Tella's approach will face similar problems if his model is extended to include labor. To obtain large amplification in our model, labor supply must be highly inelastic to prevent households from using labor to smooth their income. But the well known problem with low labor supply elasticity is that models with such calibrations are unable to replicate basic business cycle facts.
In summary, the bulk of the evidence suggests that the ability of financial frictions to amplify business cycle fluctuations is dependent on non-contingent lending contracts across a wide class of models, including the CSV, costly state enforcement and adverse selection frameworks common in the literature.
The Optimal Lending Contract in Partial Equilibrium
Our main theoretical contribution in this paper is to introduce forward looking entrepreneurs into an otherwise standard CSV model of financial frictions. In this section we outline the key differences between the dynamically optimal loan contract chosen by forward looking entrepreneurs and the contingent and non-contingent loan contracts chosen by myopic entrepreneurs in a partial equilibrium setting. Here we assume that entrepreneurs take the price of capital and the expected return to capital as given. In Section 3 we endogenize these variables in general equilibrium.
At time t, entrepreneur j purchases capital K t (j) at a unit price of Q t . At time t + 1, the entrepreneur rents this capital to perfectly competitive wholesale goods producers. The entrepreneur uses his net worth N t (j) and a loan B t (j) from the representative lender to purchase capital:
After buying capital, the entrepreneur is hit with an idiosyncratic shock ω t+1 (j) and an aggregate shock R k t+1 , so that entrepreneur j is able to deliver Q t K t (j)R k t+1 ω t+1 (j) units of assets. The idiosyncratic shock ω(j) is a log-normal random variable with distribution log(ω(j)) ∼ N (− Following BGG, we assume entrepreneurs are risk neutral and die with constant probability 1 − γ. Upon dying, entrepreneurs consume all operational equities, which are equal to net worth minus wages. If entrepreneurs survive they do not consume anything, and they supply labor and earn wages which they later reinvest. Entrepreneur j's value function is
where C e t+s is the entrepreneur's consumption,
defined as wealth accumulated from operating firms, equal to net worth without entrepreneurial real wages W 
Borrower and Lender Payoffs
The contract between the lender and borrower follows the familiar CSV framework. We assume that the lender cannot observe the realization of idiosyncratic shocks to entrepreneurs unless he pays monitoring costs µ which are a fixed percentage of total assets. Given this friction, the risk neutral borrower offers the risk averse lender a contract with an state-contingent interest rate Z t+1 subject to macroeconomic conditions.
The entrepreneur repays the loan only when it is profitable to do so. In particular, the entrepreneur will repay the loan only if, after repayment, he has more assets than liabilities.
We define the cutoff productivity levelω t+1 , also known as the bankruptcy threshold, as the minimum level of productivity necessary for an entrepreneur to repay the loan:
Minimum revenue for loan repayment (4) If ω t+1 (j) <ω t+1 the entrepreneur defaults and enters bankruptcy; if ω t+1 (j) ≥ω t+1 he repays the loan. The cutoff productivity level allows us to express the dynamics of net worth for a particular entrepreneur j:
The gross rate of return for the lender, R t+1 , also depends on the productivity cutoff. For idiosyncratic realizations above the cutoff, the lender will be repaid the full amount of the loan B t (j)Z t+1 (j). For idiosyncratic realizations below the cutoff, the entrepreneur will enter bankruptcy and the lender will pay monitoring costs µ and take over the entrepreneur's assets,
). More formally, the lender's ex post return is
Taking into account that loans to entrepreneurs are perfectly diversifiable, the lenders return on a loan R t+1 to entrepreneur j is defined as
where h(ω t+1 , σ ω,t ) is the share of total returns to capital that go to the lender. We define this share as
Share to lender if loan pays
Share to lender if loan defaults (8) where f is the probability density function and F is the cumulative distribution function of the log-normal distribution of idiosyncratic productivity.
In order to simplify the entrepreneur's optimization problem, we introduce the concept of leverage, κ t , defined as the value of the entrepreneur's capital divided by net worth:
Loan Contracts: BGG, the Myopic Contingent Contract (MCC) and the Optimal Contract
The differences between the BGG contract, the myopic contingent contract (hereafter denoted MCC) and the optimal contract arise from two sources: the lender's participation constraint and the borrower's objective function.
First, the lender's participation constraint in BGG differs from the participation constraint in the MCC and the optimal contract. The participation constraint arises from the household Euler equation and stipulates the minimum rate of return that entrepreneurs must offer to lenders to receive a loan. In BGG, the participation constraint has the following form:
where
is the household (i.e. shareholder) intertemporal marginal rate of substitution, also known as the household stochastic discount factor. Under this participation constraint, entrepreneurs pay a constant safe rate of return to the lenders, R t+1 , which ignores the risk averse representative household's desire for consumption insurance. In contrast, the participation constraint for the MCC and the optimal contract is:
The above expression implies that households prefer a state contingent rate of return that is negatively correlated with household consumption. Quite simply, households like consumption insurance. In recessions, households desire a higher rate of return because their marginal utility of consumption is high, and vice versa in booms.
Second, the borrower's objective function in BGG and MCC differs from the the objective function which gives rise to the optimal contract. Entrepreneurs in BGG and MCC maximize next period net worth, defined in equation (5). If we substitute the expression for leverage from (9) into (5), we have the entrepreneur's objective function in BGG and MCC:
In contrast, under the dynamically optimal contract entrepreneurs maximize utility, given by (2). As we have mentioned before, utility maximizing entrepreneurs are concerned not only about current capital returns but also future capital returns and future financial premiums.
We now have all of the ingredients necessary to set up the entrepreneur's optimization problem and solve for the three different loan contracts: (1) the BGG contract; (2) the MCC contract; and, (3) the optimal contract.
Proposition 1 To solve for the BGG contract, entrepreneurs choose their state contingent cutoffω t+1 and leverage κ t (j) to maximize next period net worth (13) subject to (5), (7) and (10) . The solution to this problem is given by
Proof See Appendix B.
Corollary 1 Log-linearization of the BGG optimality condition (14) and the BGG participation constraint (10) gives
where the constant ν κ = hωω hω
Proof See Appendix G. Equation (15) shows that in the BGG contract the entrepreneur's leverage depends on next period's expected financial premium while (16) shows that lenders returns (deposit rate) are predetermined. We prove in Appendix E that when lenders' returns are predetermined, to a first order approximation the lending contract is identical regardless of whether entrepreneurs are forward looking or myopic.
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Proposition 2 To solve for the MCC contract, entrepreneurs choose their state contingent cutoffω t+1 and leverage κ t (j) to maximize (13) subject to (5), (7) and (12) . The solution to this problem is given by
Proof See Appendix C.
Corollary 2 Log-linearization of the MCC optimality condition (17) and the MCC participation constraint (12) gives
Corollary 2 clearly illustrates the differences between the BGG contract and the MCC contract. In equation (19), lender's returns depend on capital returns and household consumption, both elements which are missing in the BGG contract. For standard calibrations,α takes a value between five and six and the risk aversion parameter σ is equal to one, so that lender's returns are very sensitive to the consumption level and the consumption insurance channel dominates the response to capital returns. When consumption is high, the lending rate declines; when consumption is low the lending rate increases. The negative covariance between the lender's consumption and returns reflects the nature of insurance, which amplifies the impact of shocks to the economy. Note that as entrepreneurs become more risk averse (as σ decreases), the impact of the consumption insurance channel declines. Now that we have described the BGG and MCC contracts in detail, we turn our attention to the optimal contract. As we discussed above, the optimal contract takes the consumption insurance channel from MCC and adds forward looking entrepreneurs.
Proposition 3
To solve for the optimal contract, entrepreneurs choose their state contingent cutoffω t+1 and leverage κ t (j) to maximize (2) subject to (3), (5), (7) and (12) . The solution to this problem is given by
Proof See Appendix D.
Corollary 3 Log-linearization of the optimal contract, (20) and (21), and the participation constraint (12) gives
Proof See Appendix G.
We see from (23) that under the optimal contract, the surprise to lender's returns depends not only on surprises to capital returns and consumption, as in the MCC contract, but future capital returns and future financial premiums as well. If entrepreneurs are more optimistic about expected future financial premiums or future returns to capital, they prefer to pay the lender a lower interest rate because one unit of net worth becomes more valuable. Corollary 3 thus illustrates the strong stabilizing mechanism of the optimal contract. When a crisis hits and decreases entrepreneur's net worth, expected future financial premiums will rise. But entrepreneurs will also pay lenders a smaller deposit rate, which stabilizes their net worth. As a result, the main channel for the financial accelerator, the volatility in net worth, is diminished when entrepreneurs are forward looking.
Although we have taken a partial equilibrium view here, Corollaries 1-3 are identical in the general equilibrium setting. In both partial and general equilibrium, leverage and the deposit rate are determined by the paths of capital returns and consumption. Therefore, the intuition provided by Corollaries 1-3 holds in general equilibrium.
The Model in General Equilibrium
We now embed the three loan contracts in a standard dynamic New Keynesian model. There are six agents in our model: households, entrepreneurs, financial intermediaries, capital producers, wholesalers and retailers. Entrepreneurs buy capital from capital producers and then rent it out to perfectly competitive wholesalers, who sell their goods to monopolistically competitive retailers. Retailers costlessly differentiate the wholesale goods and sell them to households at a markup over marginal cost. Retailers have price-setting power and are subject to Calvo price rigidities. Households bundle the retail goods in CES fashion into a final consumption good.
A graphical overview of the model is provided in Figure 2 . The dotted lines denote financial flows, while the solid lines denote real flows (goods, labor, and capital).
Households
The representative household maximizes its utility by choosing the optimal path of consumption, labor and money
where C t is household consumption, M t /P t denotes real money balances, and H t is household labor effort. The budget constraint of the representative household is
where W t is the real wage, T t is lump-sum taxes, Π t is profit received from household ownership of final goods firms distributed in lump-sum fashion, and D t are deposits in financial intermediaries (banks) that pay a contingent nominal gross interest rate R t , and B t are nominal bonds that pay a gross nominal non-contingent interest rate R n t . Households maximize their utility (25) subject to the budget constraint (26) with respect to deposits, labor, nominal bonds and money, yielding four first order conditions:
We define the gross rate of inflation as π t+1 = P t+1 /P t , and real money balances as m t = M t /P t .
Retailers
The final consumption good is made up of a basket of intermediate retail goods which are aggregated together in CES fashion by the representative household:
Demand for retailer i's unique variety is
where p it is the price charged by retail firm i. The aggregate price index is defined as
Each retail firm chooses its price according to Calvo (1979) in order to maximize net discounted profit. With probability 1 − θ each retailer is able to change its price in a particular period t.
where P w t is the wholesale goods price. The first order condition with respect to the retailer's price p * it is
From this condition it is clear that all retailers which are able to reset their prices in period t will choose the same price p * it = P * t ∀i. The price level will evolve according to
Dividing the left and right hand side of (36) by the price level gives
where p * t = P * t /P t . Using the same logic, we can normalize (35) and obtain:
where p w t+s = P w t+s Pt and p t+s = P t+s /P t .
Wholesalers
Wholesale goods are produced by perfectly competitive firms and then sold to monopolistically competitive retailers who costlessly differentiate them. Wholesalers hire labor from households and entrepreneurs in a competitive labor market at real wage W t and W e t and rent capital from entrepreneurs at rental rate R r t . Note that capital purchased in period t is used in period t + 1. Following BGG, the production function of the representative wholesaler is given by
where A t denotes aggregate technology, K t is capital, H t is household labor, H e t is entrepreneurial labor, and Ω defines the relative importance of household labor and entrepreneurial labor in the production process. Entrepreneurs inelastically supply one unit of labor, so that the production function simplifies to
One can express the price of the wholesale good in terms of the price of the final good. In this case, the price of the wholesale good will be
where X t is the variable markup charged by final goods producers. The objective function for wholesalers is then given by max Ht,H e t ,K t−1
Here wages and the rental price of capital are in real terms. The first order conditions with respect to capital, household labor and entrepreneurial labor are
Capital Producers
The perfectly competitive capital producer transforms final consumption goods into capital.
Capital production is subject to adjustment costs, according to
where I t is investment in period t, δ is the rate of depreciation and φ K is a parameter that governs the magnitude of the adjustment cost. The capital producer's objective function is
where Q t denotes the price of capital. The first order condition of the capital producer's optimization problem is 1
Lenders
One can think of the representative lender in the model as a perfectly competitive bank which costlessly intermediates between households and borrowers. The role of the lender is to diversify the household's funds among various entrepreneurs. The bank takes nominal household deposits D t and loans out nominal amount B t to entrepreneurs. In equilibrium, deposits will equal loanable funds (D t = B t ). Households, as owners of the bank, receive a state contingent real rate of return R t+1 on their "deposits" -which equals the rate of return on loans to entrepreneurs.
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Households choose the optimal lending rate according to their first order condition with respect to deposits:
As we discussed above, the lender prefers a return that co-varies negatively with household consumption, which amplifies the financial accelerator.
Entrepreneurs
We have already described the entrepeneur's problem in detail in Section 2. Entrepreneurs choose their cutoff productivity level and leverage according to: (14) in BGG; (17) in MCC;
and (20) and (21) in the dynamically optimal contract.
Wholesale firms rent capital at rate R Kt
Consistent with the partial equilibrium specification, entrepreneurs die with probability 1−γ, which implies the following dynamics for aggregate net worth:
Goods market clearing
We have goods market clearing
where µG(ω) = ω 0 µf (ω)ωdω is the fraction of capital returns that go to monitoring costs, paid by lenders.
Monetary Policy
We assume that there is a central bank which conducts monetary policy by choosing the nominal interest rate R n t . In Section 4 we employ the nominal interest rate rule in BGG:
where ρ R n and ξ determine the relative importance of the past interest rate and past inflation in the central bank's interest rate rule. Shocks to the nominal interest rate are given by R n . It should be noted that the interest rule in BGG differs from the conventional Taylor rule, which targets current inflation rather than past inflation.
In Section 5, we consider the conventional Taylor rule with interest rate smoothing
Shocks
The shocks in the model follow a standard AR(1) process. The AR(1) processes for technology, government spending and idiosyncratic volatility are given by
log(σ ω,t ) =(1 − ρ σω ) log(σ ω,ss ) + ρ σω log(σ ω,t−1 ) + σω t
where A , G and σω denote exogenous shocks to technology, government spending and idiosyncratic volatility, and G ss and σ ω,ss denote the steady state values for government spending and idiosyncratic volatility respectively. Recall that σ 2 ω is the variance of idiosyncratic productivity, so that σ ω is the standard deviation of idiosyncratic productivity. Nominal interest rate shocks are defined by the BGG Rule in (52) or the Taylor rule in (53).
Equilibrium
The model has 20 endogenous variables and 20 equations. The endogenous variables are: Y , H, 4 Quantitative Analysis
Calibration
Our baseline calibration largely follows BGG. We set the discount factor β = 0.99, the risk aversion parameter σ = 1 so that utility is logarithmic in consumption, and the elasticity of 
Quantitative Comparison: BGG, MCC and the Optimal Contract
In our quantitative analysis we compare three allocations: the competitive equilibrium under the BGG contract; the competitive equilibrium under the MCC contract; and the competitive equilibrium under the optimal contract. Impulse responses for shocks to technology, the nominal interest rate and idiosyncratic volatility are found in this section. Figure 3 shows impulse responses for a extremely persistent one percent technology shock when prices are sticky. Notice the impact of consumption insurance. Lenders in the MCC contract allocations will settle for a lower rate of return in a boom in order to ensure a higher rate of return in a recession, which amplifies the response of the economy. However, this does not occur under the optimal contract because entrepreneurs are forward looking: they act as a stabilizing influence on the economy. Forward looking entrepreneurs are reluctant to invest in new capital when a positive technology shock hits because financial premiums will be low. Asset prices will decline back to their steady state value, so entrepreneurs offer higher deposit rates to lender's in order utilize financial resources in states that promise higher capital returns. The stabilizing influence of forward looking entrepreneurs cancels out the consumption insurance channel under this calibration, such that the optimal contract and BGG output responses coincide almost exactly. In general, this coincidence does not hold outside of the particular calibration employed here.
The difference between the three allocations is very noticeable in Figure 4 , which plots impulse responses for a one percent shock to the nominal interest rate when prices are sticky. Because the monetary shock is less persistent than the technology shock, the price of capital depreciates back to its steady state value very quickly after an initial rise. As a result, capital returns are positive in the first period, but negative thereafter. This leads to an even sharper difference between the response of entrepreneurs in the three models. Under the BGG contract the deposit rate does not respond to the shock at all because it is predetermined; under the MCC contract the deposit rate falls because household consumption increases in response to the shock; and under the optimal contract the deposit rate increases, because the financial premium goes down after the shock. Forward looking entrepreneurs thus stabilize consumption and output, leading to small amplification. In contrast, the MCC contract with consumption insurance leads to a decline in the lending rate following the rise in consumption, which amplifies the response of output, consumption and other macroeconomic aggregates to the interest rate shock.
In Figure 5 we plot impulse responses for a one standard deviation increase in unobserved idiosyncratic volatility σ ω . This is what we defined earlier as a risk shock. In all three models, the household consumption response on impact is close to zero, but slightly positive for MCC and BGG and slightly negative for the optimal contract. The consumption insurance channel in MCC and the optimal contract leads to a decline in the lending rate following a risk shock.
An additional factor is at work under the optimal contract: the financial premium rises because, other things equal, higher idiosyncratic variance makes default more likely. Therefore, borrowing is more expensive and returns to capital are higher. Net worth thus increases on impact under the optimal contract. Overall, risk shocks have a very small impact on the real economy in the optimal contract equilibrium, and may even boost output over a longer time horizon. Also note the negative correlation between output and consumption under the optimal contract, unlike the BGG contract where output and consumption both fall. Keynesian model. Figure 6 shows that all three models with frictions generate more amplification than the basic New Keynesian model for very persistent technology shocks. In this case, forward looking entrepreneurs forecast higher capital returns in the future, which makes one unit of net worth more valuable today, leading to a large increase in net worth following the shock. For less persistent technology shocks (ρ A = 0.99 for example) amplification under the optimal contract is actually lower than in the basic New Keynesian model. We employ a second frictionless benchmark for the following reason. The basic New Keynesian sticky price model deviates from the CSV framework in two dimensions: (1) it abstracts from heterogeneity between lenders and borrowers because there are no entrepreneurs, and (2) it has no CSV frictions. As a result, if we use only the basic New Keynesian model as a frictionless benchmark, it is difficult to isolate the impact of the CSV friction on volatility from the impact of heterogeneity. In order to perfectly isolate these two effects, we need a model that incorporates heterogeneity between lenders and borrowers but which eliminates the CSV friction. The second frictionless benchmark does exactly that, isolating the role of the CSV friction in generating volatility. Now, let us consider the amplification response of the model with frictions relative to the frictionless benchmark with no monitoring costs. As we discussed earlier, the amplifying effect of the CSV framework depends on three characteristics: a suboptimal lending contract, extremely persistent technology shocks and loose monetary policy. The removal of any one of these characteristics eliminates the financial accelerator or even reverses the accelerator, such that financial frictions stabilize the economy in the presence of shocks. 
Sensitivity of the Financial Accelerator to Different Monetary Policy Rules
How sensitive is the financial accelerator to different monetary policy rules? 8 Figure 8 plots output responses to a 25 basis point shock to the nominal interest rate for the BGG monetary policy rule (Row 1), the inertial Taylor rule (Row 2) and the conventional Taylor rule (Row 3).
Here we see the sensitivity of the financial accelerator to different monetary policy specifications.
Under the BGG policy rule, the coefficient on past inflation is ξ = 0.11, while the interest rate smoothing parameter is ρ R n = 0.9. Following the initial 25 basis point decrease in the nominal interest rate, there is little subsequent change in the interest rate under the BGG policy rule because the central bank is targeting past inflation, and also smoothing the interest rate. Any increase in inflation on impact is not taken into account until the next quarter. Under the BGG policy rule, monetary shocks are thus quite persistent, and entrepreneur's increase their net worth in the first period, which amplifies the shock. On the other hand, under conservative monetary policy asset prices and net worth are more stable, and there is no amplification.
We also calculate the quarterly inflation response to a monetary shock for the BGG policy rule and the conventional Taylor rule. For the conventional Taylor rule with a weight ρ R n = 0.5 on the previous interest rate, a two percent surprise to the Fed funds rate in annual terms leads to a one percent inflation response, while for the BGG monetary policy rule a one percent surprise to the Fed funds rate will lead to four percent inflation response, which significantly deviates from the flexible price equilibrium.
Overall, our simulations show that under the MCC contract and the optimal contract, financial frictions do not amplify business cycles for any calibration, while under the BGG contract they amplify business cycles only when technology shocks are extremely persistent and monetary policy is loose.
Sensitivity of the Financial Accelerator to Household Risk Aversion
One might expect that an increase in household risk aversion would shift aggregate risk onto the balance sheet of entrepreneurs, causing the financial accelerator to reappear. However, we find that households sell insurance to entrepreneurs and use labor supply to smooth their consumption regardless of the degree of risk aversion. 9 Although this may seem counterintuitive, it is natural for entrepreneurs to increase their returns by shifting aggregate risk to households, as households can smooth their consumption through variation in labor while enjoying higher returns from insuring aggregate risk. The only way to motivate households to buy insurance from entrepreneurs is to make labor supply elasticity very small, which counterfactually reduces business cycle fluctuations to a minimum. Thus, we find that financial frictions with statecontingent contracts and forward looking entrepreneurs stabilize business cycles even when households are extremely risk averse.
Conclusion
This paper contributes to the literature on financial frictions in macroeconomics by introducing forward looking entrepreneurs into the costly state verification framework. In the literature, lending contracts are suboptimal and entrepreneurs are myopic. We solve for the optimal contract with forward looking entrepreneurs and show that financial frictions neither amplify nor propagate business cycles when lending contracts are optimal. In addition, we show that shocks to the variance of the unobserved productivity of entrepreneurs -so-called "risk shocks" -have little effect on the economy and generate the wrong comovement between macroeconomic aggregates when contracts are optimal.
We also investigate the robustness of the financial accelerator under the standard BGG contract, which assumes that lenders receive a constant safe rate of return and borrowers are myopic. In this setup, we find that the accelerator depends on a combination of three things: a suboptimal lending contract, extremely persistent technology shocks, and loose monetary policy.
Stationary technology shocks or a standard Taylor rule eliminate the financial accelerator or even reverse the accelerator such that financial frictions stabilize macroeconomic fluctuations.
We thus conclude that the amplifying effect of financial frictions is present only under very restrictive conditions in costly state verification models.
Our result that amplification requires a combination of a suboptimal non-contingent lending rate and asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders appears to be quite general and not at all specific to the CSV framework. Dmitriev and Hoddenbagh (2014) 
Technical Appendix A Value Function Transformation
We can also formulate the optimal contract using normalized variables. For example, one can substitute leverage into the right hand side of equation (5) suppose the entrepreneur invests one dollar in period t and continues to reinvest his profits in new projects in each subsequent period. In period t+s, the entrepreneur will have accumulated R e t,t+s from his initial one dollar investment. We can substitute (A.2) into the value function (2) and obtain
Because the entrepreneur will optimize with respect to leverage and the productivity cutoff we want to express (A.3) as a function of the leverage and the productivity cutoff. In the first step, we separate terms to get
where we usedR e t,t+s =R e t,t+1R e t+1,t+s . Net worth enters the value function as a constant multiplicative term and has no effect on the entrepreneur's choice of leverage κ t (j) or cutoffω t+1 ; both enter only throughR e t,t+1 . Using the law of iterated expectations E t (x t+1 ) = E t [E(x t+1 |Ω agg,t+1 )] and the independence of idiosyncratic productivity from aggregate productivity, we can replace the realizations of idiosyncratic productivity with their expectation and get 
Now we can reexpress value function as
If we divide the lender's ex post returns in equation (7) by N t (j) we get
Now, if we substitute (A.7) into the Euler equation for the representative household (12), we have
Before looking at the first order conditions to the optimization problem, it is important to notice that all entrepreneurs will choose the same leverage and state-contingent interest rate regardless of their net worth, due to the homotheticity of the problem. Thus, the entrepreneur index (j) is omitted below. We use the following notation: BGG refers to the contract of Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) , M CC refers to the myopic contingent contract, and
Optimal refers to the optimal contract with non-myopic entrepreneurs
B BGG Contract
In the BGG contract, the lender is guaranteed a fixed rate of return. In this case, the entrepreneur's Lagrangian will be:
The entrepreneur's first order conditions with respect to κ t andω t+1 are:
If we substitute
, we find
Rearranging, simplifying and substituting in the stochastic discount factor yields:
.
(B.4)

C MCC Contract
In the MCC contract, the entrepreneur's Lagrangian is:
Rearranging these first order conditions, solving in terms of λ t and setting them equal to each other yields:
D Optimal Contract With Forward Looking Entrepreneurs
Under the optimal contract, the forward looking entrepreneur's Lagrangian has the following form (if we divide the value function by (1 − γ)N t (j) as a scaling factor):
. The entrepreneur's first order condition with respect to leverage κ t is:
where we have used the fact that ∂Ψt ∂κt = E t g(ω t+1 , σ ω,t )R k,t+1 Ψ t+1 and ∂Ψ t+i ∂κt = 0 for i = 1, 2, ...
The entrepreneur's first order condition with respect to the productivity cutoffω t+1 is:
∂L
Optimal t ∂ω t+1 =(1 − γ) N t (j)κ t g ω (ω t+1 , σ ω,t )R k,t+1 Ψ t+1 + λ t βU C,t+1 κ t R k,t+1 h ω (ω t+1 , σ ω,t ) = 0.
(D.1)
where we have used the fact that ∂Ψt ∂ω t+1 = κ t g (ω t+1 , σ ω,t )R k,t+1 Ψ t+1 and ∂Ψ t+i ∂ω t+1
= 0 for i = 1, 2...
We then move λ t to the right hand side of both first order conditions and divide the equations by each other to obtain:
g ω (ω t+1 , σ ω,t )E t+1 Ψ t+1 E t R k t+1 g(ω t+1 , σ ω,t )Ψ t+1 = βκ t U C,t+1 h ω (ω t+1 , σ ω,t ) βE t U C,t+1 κ t R k t+1 h(ω t+1 ) − κ t U C,t = βκ t U C,t+1 h ω (ω t+1 , σ ω,t ) (κ t − 1)U C,t − κ t U C,t where we utilized the participation constraint for lenders in the final step. After rearranging and simplifying, we get λ t+i+1 βE t U c,t+i+1 κ t+i R k,t+i+1 h(ω t+i+1 , σ ω,t+i ) − (κ t+i − 1)U c,t+i , where Ψ t = 1 + κ t E t g(ω t+1 , σ ω,t )R k,t+1 Ψ t+1 . The entrepreneur's first order condition with respect to leverage κ t is:
∂L t ∂κ t = (1 − γ)E t N t (j)g(ω t+1 , σ ω,t )R k,t+1 Ψ t+1 + λ t+1 βE t U C,t+1 R k t+1 h(ω t+1 , σ ω,t ) − U C,t = 0,
where we have used the fact that ∂Ψt ∂κt = E t g(ω t+1 , σ ω,t )R k,t+1 Ψ t+1 and The entrepreneur's first order condition with respect to the productivity cutoffω t+1 is:
∂L t ∂ω t+1 =(1 − γ) N t (j)κ t g ω (ω t+1 , σ ω,t )R k,t+1 Ψ t+1 + λ t+1 βE t U C,t+1 κ t R k,t+1 h ω (ω t+1 , σ ω,t ) = 0.
(E.2)
where we have used the fact that = 0. Then, using the participation constraint to simplify and after some rearranging, we obtain:
(E.3)
It is trivial to show that log-linearization of the BGG contract with myopic or non-myopic agents gives an identical optimality condition. However, this identity does not hold for higher order approximations.
F Complete Log-Linearized Model
In this section we review the whole model in its log-linearized form.
New Keynesian Components
We begin with the set of equations characterizing the standard New Keynesian components of the model. Equation ( − σ E tĈt+1 −Ĉ t + E tRt+1 = 0, (F.1)
3) 
Entrepreneurial Consumption and Net Worth
The evolution of entrepreneurial net worth is given by (F.14), where (F.15) defines leverage.
Entrepreneurial consumption is defined by (F.16) and the financial premium is given by (F.17).
N t+1 = N (N t +R t+1 + κ(R k t+1 −R t+1 ) + ν Ψσω,t ) + (1 − N )(Ŷ t −X t ), (F.14) 
Dynamics of the Lending Rate
The BGG lending rate is defined as (F.18a), the MCC lending rate is defined as (F.18b) and the optimal lending rate is defined as (F.18c). These log-linear expressions are derived in Appendix We begin by log-linearizing the common optimality condition for each contract. The non-linear participation constraint and FOC are, respectively:
βE t U C,t+1 k t R k t+1 h(ω t+1 , σ ω,t ) − (k t − 1)U C,t = 0, (G.1)
